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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CRESTVIEW-HOLLADAY HOME OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
CASE NO. 14090

vs,
ENGH FLORAL CO., a Utah corporation, dba Engh Floral and Garden
Center, SALT LAKE COUNTY, a
Political Subdivision, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiffs and Respondents herein respectfully petition the court for a rehearing on the following grounds:
1.

The court failed to give proper approbation to _he

advantageous position of the trial court in weighing the
evidence and improperly overturned the trial court's findings when they were supported by substantial evidence.
2.

The court's misconstruction of the terms "arbitrary"

and "capricious" seriously undermines the power and responsibility of courts to review challenged actions of county
zoning officials.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
Nature of Case
This was an appeal from a judgment of the District
Court setting aside as spot zoning an amendment to the
Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinances reclassifying thirteen
acres of Engh Floral Company's property from Agricultural
A-l to Residential R-M and Commercial C-2.
Disposition on Appeal
This court held the Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake County acted within the scope of its legislative
powers, the reclassification ordinance was adopted pursuant to a planning scheme developed for that portion of
the county in question, and the Homeowners Association had
failed to sustain their burden that the action of the county
was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.
Statement of Facts
On August 16, 1973, the Salt Lake County Commission
by a 2-1 vote approved Engh Floral Company's application
for rezoning and reclassified a thirteen acre parcel of
property in the heart of a single and two-family residential district from an A-l to a C-2 and R-M zone.

The three

acre parcel zoned C-2 could potentially be used for such
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activities as a service station, restaurant, and a Class B
beer outlet.

On the ten acres zoned R-M there could be

constructed 200 new residential units, and if conditional
uses are granted, business offices, hotels, nursing homes
and mobile home parks could be located on the R-M property.
Fearing the potential effect of this zoning change on
the character of the neighborhood, the surrounding property
owners challenged the validity of the reclassification ordinance.

The trial court held the sole motive for enacting

the reclassification ordinance was to amend the zoning pattern to comply with the Engh Floral Company non-conforming
use, such action being arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious;
the sole and exclusive benefit of the zoning change would be
to Engh Floral Company as it would enhance materially the
value of its property; the rezoning would not add to the
enjoyment of the adjacent property, but would alter irrevocably the character of the general area and so burden the
neighboring residential area as to cause substantial and material damage to the adjacent property owners and impair the
use and enjoyment of their property; there is no need to
rezone the area to permit uses other than those embraced
within permissible non-conforming uses; and the zoning ordinance reclassifying the Engh Floral Company property constitutes spot zoning and is invalid.
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This court reversed the trial court's finding and
upheld the reclassification ordinance basing its decision on
its so-called "policy" to avoid substituting its judgment
for that of the legislative body of the municipality.
ARGUMENT
I 'THE COURT FAILED TO GIVE PROPER APPROBATION TO THE
ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN WEIGHING THE
EVIDENCE AND IMPROPERLY OVERTURNED THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WHEN THEY WERE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The basis for this court's determination to overrule
the judgment of the trial court is expressed in the following excerpt from the decision:
The prior decisions of this court without
exception have laid down the rule that the exercise of the zoning power is a legislative function to be exercised by the legislative bodies of
the municipalities. The wisdom of the zoning plan#
its necessity, the nature and boundaries of the
district to be zoned are matters which lie solely
within that discretion. It is the policy of this
court as enunciated in its prior decisions that
it will avoid substituting its judgment for that
of the legislative body of the municipality.
Despite this court's manifest dissatisfaction to substitute its judgment for that of the Board of Commissioners
of Salt Lake County, it has a duty to accept the trial
court's findings that the reclassification ordinance constitutes spot zoning and that the action of the Board of
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County Commissioners was arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious if there is any substantial evidence to support
its findings.

-

In Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 22 Utah 2d 143,
449 P.2d 989 (1969) the plaintiffs purchased property near
on and off ramps for the 1-15 Freeway with the hopes of
converting grazing land worth twenty or thirty dollars per
acre into highway service land worth $10,000 per acre.
The Beaver County Commissioners refused to rezone the subject property to permit highway services on the basis that
the property would cause a loss of tourist business to
existing cities in the county, the county would be required
to furnish police protection to the proposed new area and
transporation would need to be provided for school children
who might live there to established schools in the county.
This court implied dissatisfaction with the action of the
Board of Commissioners of Beaver County but apparently felt
constrained to uphold their decision rather than overrule
the trial court.

The court stated:

Whether we agree with the wisdom of the
county commissioners or do not agree with it
is of no importance. The matter is to be decided by a legislative body (the county commission) , and the courts do not ordinarily
interfere in such matters. However, should a
board enact an ordinance which deprives a person of his property, and where it is clear that
the board has acted arbitrarily, capriciously,
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or in a discriminating manner, the courts
will grant redress.
* * *

This being an equitable proceeding,
we may review the findings but should not
disturb them unless they are clearly against
the weight of the evidence. (Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar the trial court determined that
the county officials had acted in an arbitrary, capricious
and unreasonable manner and these findings should stand unless clearly against the weight of evidence.

The fact that

this court on appeal might have viewed the matter differently
does not justify a reversal of the trial court's findings
and judgment.

In Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 28 6, 4 95

P.2d 811 (1972), a suit in equity to set aside deeds, the
court stated:
It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that
this action to avoid deeds is one in equity
upon which this court has both the prerogative and the duty to review and weigh the
evidence, and to determine the facts. However , in the practical application of that
rule it is well established in our decisional
law that due to the advantaged position of
the trial court, in close proximity to the
parties and the witnesses, there is indulged
a presumption of correctness of his findings
and judgment, with the burden upon the appellant to show they were in error; and where
the evidence is in conflict, we do not upset
his findings merely because we may have reviewed the matter differently, but do so only
if evidence clearly preponderates against them.
(Emphasis added.)
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See also Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430
(1970); Nelson v. Nelson, 30 Utah 2d 80, 513 P.2d 1011
(1973); and Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142
(1973) .
In the case at bar there was substantial evidence to
support the trial court's findings and judgment that the
Salt Lake County zoning officials acted in an arbitrary,
capricious or discriminatory manner and that the ordinance
in question amounts to spot zoning.

The Engh Floral Company

is the only commercial enterprise in the area bounded by
3300 South and 4500 South on the north and south and 2300
East and Highland Drive on the east and west (JR.56,45).

The

thirteen acres involved represents approximately one percent of the approximately 1,240 acres lying in this core
area.

The property situated directly south of the Engh

Floral Company is zoned R-l-10 (generally authorizing agriculture and single family homes); property to the east
and northwest is zoned R-2-104 (generally authorizing agriculture and one and two family dwellings); and property
to the west is zoned R-2-8 (generally authorizing agriculture and one and two family dwellings) (Ex. 16-P; R.144,145).
In one of Mr. Engh's previous applications to change the zoning on his property the Staff Report for the District Plan-
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ning Commission had recommended the application be denied
as spot zoning and stated it would be "very poor planning
to allow any commercial zoning at this location11 (R.146).
Clayne Ricks, Planning Director for the Salt Lake Planning
Commission, testified that the rezoning would enhance the
value of the Engh property and that he could not recall a
similar zoning change in Salt Lake County in the last five
years (R.148,65)."
This court's decision makes no reference to the abovestated facts.

They are unrebutted, relevant and material.

This court, in derogation of its own stated principals of
the scope of appellate review, simply disregarded the lower
court's findings and based its decision on its "policy"
to avoid substituting its judgment for that of the Board of
County Commissioners.

Does it matter that this court sub-

stituted its judgment or opinion for that of the trier of
the facts?

The only facts cited in this court's opinion

that support its conclusion are either in conflict with
other evidence or else are insubstantial in light of other
facts.
In its opinion this court states that "it is doubtful
that the term 'spot zoning' applies to this case in view of
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the size of the tract".

The trial court, which heard the

evidence, found the facts to be "spot zoning."

The evidence

in that regard was substantial and convincing, and nowhere
does this court hold that such a determination was a question
of law.

Clayne Ricks, who is the recognized expert in

zoning matters in Salt Lake County, testified that the size
of the parcel rezoned is immaterial as a parcel of one
hundred acres could constitute spot zoning if completely
detrimental or for the benefit of one person (R.56).

This

court also relies on the Big Cottonwood Master Plan to
support the action of the County Commissioners.

In so doing

the court either overlooked or disregarded the testimony of
Clayne Ricks that Williams and Mocine, the consulting firm
which drew up the Master Plan, worked extensively with the
Planning Commission (R.55).

In essence, the consulting firm

was simply back stopping the decision which the Planning
Commission had already taken to approve the Engh rezoning
application.
Finally, in an attempt to show spot zoning is not
-involved this court observes there are a number of commercial
enterprises surrounding the Engh property.

While other

"enterprises" may exist they are few in number, extremely
small and limited in nature, exist as non-conforming uses
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and do not have an impact on the character of the neighborhood.

Engh Floral is the only real business in the immed-

iate area.

Furthermore, as argued in Respondent's Appeal

Brief, the theory of zoning is that non-conforming uses
being detrimental to the public are not to be perpetuated,
but should be gradually eliminated to comport the area to
the comprehensive zoning plan.
The case at bar involves a factual determination of
whether the action of the Salt Lake County zoning officials
in adopting the ordinance reclassifying the Engh property
constitutes spot zoning.

After having thoroughly considered

the testimony and exhibits presented at trial the lower
court concluded the ordinance in question constituted "spot
zoning".

Such a finding is supported by substantial evidence

and should have been sustained on appeal if this court is
to adhere to its own stated principals relating to the trial
court's findings.
II
THE COURT'S MISCONSTRUCTION OF THE TERMS "ARBITRARY"
AND "CAPRICIOUS" SERIOUSLY UNDERMINES THE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY OF COURTS TO REVIEW CHALLENGED ACTIONS OF
ZONING OFFICIALS.
Courts ordinarily should not interfere in zoning mat-
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ters.

However, it is the court's inherent responsibility to

see that the zoning officials do not abuse the liberal
discretion they are given and to take action when the zoning
officials act in an arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory
manner.

The duty of this court not to substitute its judg-

ment for that of the county zoning officials is no more imperative than the power and duty of this court to set aside
any purported exercise of the zoning officials' discretion
which is in fact arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.
Zoning in this respect can no more escape judicial review
than any other purported exercise of the police power.
The only other possible rational explanation for this
court's decision is that it misconstrued the terms "arbitrary"
and "capricious".

These words when used in a legal sense

are to be distinguished from the same words used in a popular sense, where they have an opprobious connotation.

In

Ostler v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 437, 36 P.2d 95,
98 (1934) this court had occasion to define the terras "arbitrary" and "capricious".

The court stated:

It would seem the words "arbitrarily" and
"capriciously" are used merely to characterize
a conclusion, when the conclusion is announced
with no substantial evidence to support it or a
conclusion contrary to substantial competent
evidence.
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While the above definition was used in the context of
a review of a decision of the Industrial Commission of Utah,
this definition applies to a review of all decisions of administrative bodies, including zoning officials, which are
challenged as arbitrary and capricious.

For cases in which

courts have defined the terms "arbitrary" and "capricious"
in their legal sense see the following cases:

City of

North Little Rock v. Habrle, 239 Ark. 1007, 395 S.W.2d
751, 753 (arbitrary and capricious action of zoning officials
defined to mean not guided by steady judgment or purpose);
Tri-County Electric Co-op, Inc. v. Elkin,

N.D.

_,

224 N.W.2d 785, 794 (arbitrary and capricious used to indicate the findings are without rational basis or that the
evidence to support the findings is nonexistent or without
probative value); Toole v. Toole, 260 S.C. 235, 195 S.E.2d
389, 391 (arbitrary and capricious used to mean the verdict
is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence); Canty
v. Board of Education, City of New York, D.C.N.Y., 312 F.Supp.
254, 256 (an administrative decision is arbitrary and capricious when it is not supported by evidence or where there
is no reasonable justification for the decision); Montgomery
County v. Merlands Club, Inc., 202 Md. 279, 76 A.2d 261,
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267 (county zoning board's denial of application for exception based on incorrect legal premise and unsupported by
substantial evidence was arbitrary and capricious in a legal
sense and could be set aside by the court).
It would be hard to conceive of a more classic example
of spot zoning than that present in the case at bar.

The

trial court's findings are explicit in showing the one-sided
benefit of the reclassification ordinance and the potential
deteriorative effect of the ordinance on the character of
the neighborhood in question.

The findings of the trial

court further indicate the zoning officials' action was based
on an incorrect legal premise, i.e., amending the zoning patern to comply with Engh Floral Company's non-conforming use
(See Point III of Respondent's Brief).

To reverse these

findings and the judgment entered below because of this
court's "policy" to avoid substituting "its" judgment for
the legislative body of the municipality is tantamount to
giving the zoning officials a carte blanche in all zoning
decisions.
The precedent established by this court's decision
seriously undermines the power and responsibility of our
courts to set aside arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory
actions of zoning officials.
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CONCLUSION
It is submitted that this court was duty bound to give
approbation to the findings of the trial court and uphold its
judgment as they were supported by substantial evidence.
Not only did the court not follow the lower court decision,
it failed to mention and distinguish the facts relied on by
the trial court in reaching its decision.
For these reasons, a rehearing should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

William G. Fowler
Terry L. Christiansen
ROE AND FOWLER
34 0 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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